The Genesis of Neoconservativism

Neoconservatives, the joke goes, are liberals who have been mugged. While that may have been true for a couple of the early neo-con writers, like Irving Kristol, their foreign policy is actually a strange offshoot from realism.

People like Wolfowitz, Kirkpatrick, etc., all shared the great realist prejudice - disdain for institutions. However, these early neo-cons (Wolfowitz was advising Reagan's people in the early 80s) didn't like the essential humility that defensive realism has as its core - that Western hegemony is impossible, and that revisionist states will ultimately overextend and crumble. But they did not take the offensive realist route, along with Mearsheimer, that Western hegemony is a rational goal, and the fact that no one has been able to acheive it doesn't disprove its possibility but rather shows that states miscalculate their strengths while pursuing this goal. Instead, they disregarded any assessment of American strength that said America couldn't just pick up and do anything. While offensive realists such as Mearsheimer made predictions that the US and its allies would mop up the USSR in a land war (a possibility that continental European countries were not eager to test), the Neo-Cons argued that the US could do all that and more by itself - allies be damned. (While at the same time publicly overestimating the USSR's bombing capabilities...scare tactics and WMD - a Neo-con tradition)
So in 2002 offensive realists asked how we could possibly invade and hold Iraq a) without major alliances, b) with minimal troop presence, and c) in the face of all the major problems that inevitably come with such a venture. Mearsheimer made his bones studying tank warfare, Pape made his studying strategic bombing and suicide terrorism. Neither had a rosy view of what a post-occupation Iraq would look like.
But Neo-Cons have never been partial to long analysis that takes into account things like asymmetrical warfare, resource allocation, regional dynamics, etc. To them, such things were mere quibbles meant to obscure the fact that the USA had the most powerful military in the world.

Neoconservatism is dead. But it shares aspects with many traditions before it. When we reflect on the invasion of Vietnam or the occupation of the Philippines, we should remeber that these conflicts were initiated, prolonged, and exacerbated by ideologues that eschewed things like regional experts and allies' opinions. There will be the possibility for many more Iraqs, Vietnams, Philippines in the future. The question is, will we recognize them before we jump headlong into disaster?