Saturday, December 6, 2008
Somali Pirates
The only effective government Somalia has had since 1991 was the brief tenure of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU, with vague ties to Al-Qaeda). They virtually eradicated piracy (it was punishable by beheading), and imposed Shari'a. But their government was overthrown by American-backed Ethiopian troops. So now the questions arises - do we engage the ICU and try to reposition them in power? Or are piracy and anarchy throughout the country just the price we pay for keeping the ICU out of power? And would people even be mentioning this as a possibility if piracy were not disrupting oil shipping?
Monday, December 1, 2008
Finally Figured it out
Why is privatization of social security always on the Republican agenda? Why, even after several stock market crashes, do "free-marketeers" always insist that Americans should have the freedom to invest their social security savings in the stock market?
The same reason that adjustable-rate mortgages became so damn common - they need ever newer sources of money to put into the market to continue the growth rate of their (not our) portfolios. Michael Lewis recently noted in an article that what made the sub-prime collapse so bad was that investment banks wound up making side bets on their ARMs (kinda like fantasy baseball, except that when the ARMs defaulted the I-banks went belly up). The reason for the side bets was that there just weren't enough people in the market for ARMs to satisfy the I-banks, so they duplicated the ARMs by betting on them with hedge fund managers.
Social security would be a very similar scenario - it's not that investing the money is better for the individual taxpayer (far from it, most likely), but it's better for the Wall Streeters. They don't give a damn whether there's a hiccup in the market that causes people to lose their retirement savings, just like they weren't concerned that the ARMs might eventually forclose on people - the short term benefits to their portfolios (though not necessarily their shareholders' porfolios) would be astronomical.
The same reason that adjustable-rate mortgages became so damn common - they need ever newer sources of money to put into the market to continue the growth rate of their (not our) portfolios. Michael Lewis recently noted in an article that what made the sub-prime collapse so bad was that investment banks wound up making side bets on their ARMs (kinda like fantasy baseball, except that when the ARMs defaulted the I-banks went belly up). The reason for the side bets was that there just weren't enough people in the market for ARMs to satisfy the I-banks, so they duplicated the ARMs by betting on them with hedge fund managers.
Social security would be a very similar scenario - it's not that investing the money is better for the individual taxpayer (far from it, most likely), but it's better for the Wall Streeters. They don't give a damn whether there's a hiccup in the market that causes people to lose their retirement savings, just like they weren't concerned that the ARMs might eventually forclose on people - the short term benefits to their portfolios (though not necessarily their shareholders' porfolios) would be astronomical.
Thursday, November 20, 2008
Unpacking Romney's Perscription
Mitt Romney is actually uniquely qualified to comment on what Detroit needs to do to save itself - his father was an auto exec who helped make American cars profitable in the 1950s. He wrote an op-ed for the NYTimes, available here. However, there are several problems with this, and I feel it's worth unpacking the whole thing:
"First, their huge disadvantage in costs relative to foreign brands must be eliminated. That means new labor agreements to align pay and benefits to match those of workers at competitors like BMW, Honda, Nissan and Toyota. Furthermore, retiree benefits must be reduced so that the total burden per auto for domestic makers is not higher than that of foreign producers."
Well, in Germany and Japan, the car companies don't have to provide benefits to their workers because their governments are on the ball. What Mitt is doing here is actually quite dishonest - he's saying that workers at these other companies don't have the sweet packages that American workers do, but then failing to note that workers at BMW, Honda, etc., still have those packages, but from a different source. So by not advocating for the government step in, Romney is saying that the workers should be the first to be screwed.
Maybe, in times of need, everyone involved with the compnay needs to take a hit, and this is how workers should take theirs. If so, there need to be guarantees that if the companies become profitable again, that workers won't be cut out of those gains.
"That extra burden is estimated to be more than $2,000 per car. Think what that means: Ford, for example, needs to cut $2,000 worth of features and quality out of its Taurus to compete with Toyota’s Avalon. Of course the Avalon feels like a better product — it has $2,000 more put into it. Considering this disadvantage, Detroit has done a remarkable job of designing and engineering its cars. But if this cost penalty persists, any bailout will only delay the inevitable."
Wait a minute - when one thing (one thing!) goes wrong with my car, if I take it to the dealer most likely it will cost me $900. Aesthetic features might cost less, but not by much (the 10-disc CD changer that's broken in my volvo would cost $450 to fix/replace). So how many features are covered by this $2,000 discrepancy between the Taurus and the Avalon? This points to two problems - first, consumers are over a barrel in terms of the markup on these things. Romney is implying that $2,000 makes a huge difference for features on a car. With a budget of $2,000, I would have to choose between replacing my CD changer and fixing my A/C. Second, if, as I suspect, $2,000 doesn't mean too many extra features (of course at the production stage it means more than at my stage, but how much more?), then that means that Toyota is simply choosing to make a better car, and Ford is simply choosing to make a worse car. The $2,000 isn't making the difference, the company's designs and attitudes are.
"Companies in the 21st century cannot perpetuate the destructive labor relations of the 20th. This will mean a new direction for the U.A.W., profit sharing or stock grants to all employees and a change in Big Three management culture. The need for collaboration will mean accepting sanity in salaries and perks. At American Motors, my dad cut his pay and that of his executive team, he bought stock in the company, and he went out to factories to talk to workers directly. Get rid of the planes, the executive dining rooms — all the symbols that breed resentment among the hundreds of thousands who will also be sacrificing to keep the companies afloat."
At first blush this seems like sane advice, until we remember how Mitt made his hundreds of millions - hedge fund managing. He did not seem opposed to ridiculous remuneration for himself and his investors, so we need to ask where the new-found money from these cuts are really going to wind up. He says:
"Investments must be made for the future. No more focus on quarterly earnings or the kind of short-term stock appreciation that means quick riches for executives with options. Manage with an eye on cash flow, balance sheets and long-term appreciation. Invest in truly competitive products and innovative technologies — especially fuel-saving designs — that may not arrive for years. Starving research and development is like eating the seed corn."
Interesting that it took him 2/3 of the column to finally get to better R&D. To my mind, that should have been up top, probably before cutting workers' benefits. Because R&D is more than simply a question of hybrid vs. fuel cell - it dictates what cars you're making. And Detroit has been making ugly, shitty cars for years. Cadillac is finally catching up to German and Japanese cars in terms of reliability. My questions - where the hell were they 20 years ago? And why hasn't the rest of GM caught up? What about Ford? The Mustang is an awesome looking car, but you don't want to own it for more than 6 years. Why is this still a problem?
"The American auto industry is vital to our national interest as an employer and as a hub for manufacturing. A managed bankruptcy may be the only path to the fundamental restructuring the industry needs. It would permit the companies to shed excess labor, pension and real estate costs. The federal government should provide guarantees for post-bankruptcy financing and assure car buyers that their warranties are not at risk. In a managed bankruptcy, the federal government would propel newly competitive and viable automakers, rather than seal their fate with a bailout check."
Right, and in bankruptcy all union contracts become null and void. Would taking care of laborers count as part of "post-bankruptcy financing" guaranteed by the federal government? Probably not if Mitt had his way.
"First, their huge disadvantage in costs relative to foreign brands must be eliminated. That means new labor agreements to align pay and benefits to match those of workers at competitors like BMW, Honda, Nissan and Toyota. Furthermore, retiree benefits must be reduced so that the total burden per auto for domestic makers is not higher than that of foreign producers."
Well, in Germany and Japan, the car companies don't have to provide benefits to their workers because their governments are on the ball. What Mitt is doing here is actually quite dishonest - he's saying that workers at these other companies don't have the sweet packages that American workers do, but then failing to note that workers at BMW, Honda, etc., still have those packages, but from a different source. So by not advocating for the government step in, Romney is saying that the workers should be the first to be screwed.
Maybe, in times of need, everyone involved with the compnay needs to take a hit, and this is how workers should take theirs. If so, there need to be guarantees that if the companies become profitable again, that workers won't be cut out of those gains.
"That extra burden is estimated to be more than $2,000 per car. Think what that means: Ford, for example, needs to cut $2,000 worth of features and quality out of its Taurus to compete with Toyota’s Avalon. Of course the Avalon feels like a better product — it has $2,000 more put into it. Considering this disadvantage, Detroit has done a remarkable job of designing and engineering its cars. But if this cost penalty persists, any bailout will only delay the inevitable."
Wait a minute - when one thing (one thing!) goes wrong with my car, if I take it to the dealer most likely it will cost me $900. Aesthetic features might cost less, but not by much (the 10-disc CD changer that's broken in my volvo would cost $450 to fix/replace). So how many features are covered by this $2,000 discrepancy between the Taurus and the Avalon? This points to two problems - first, consumers are over a barrel in terms of the markup on these things. Romney is implying that $2,000 makes a huge difference for features on a car. With a budget of $2,000, I would have to choose between replacing my CD changer and fixing my A/C. Second, if, as I suspect, $2,000 doesn't mean too many extra features (of course at the production stage it means more than at my stage, but how much more?), then that means that Toyota is simply choosing to make a better car, and Ford is simply choosing to make a worse car. The $2,000 isn't making the difference, the company's designs and attitudes are.
"Companies in the 21st century cannot perpetuate the destructive labor relations of the 20th. This will mean a new direction for the U.A.W., profit sharing or stock grants to all employees and a change in Big Three management culture. The need for collaboration will mean accepting sanity in salaries and perks. At American Motors, my dad cut his pay and that of his executive team, he bought stock in the company, and he went out to factories to talk to workers directly. Get rid of the planes, the executive dining rooms — all the symbols that breed resentment among the hundreds of thousands who will also be sacrificing to keep the companies afloat."
At first blush this seems like sane advice, until we remember how Mitt made his hundreds of millions - hedge fund managing. He did not seem opposed to ridiculous remuneration for himself and his investors, so we need to ask where the new-found money from these cuts are really going to wind up. He says:
"Investments must be made for the future. No more focus on quarterly earnings or the kind of short-term stock appreciation that means quick riches for executives with options. Manage with an eye on cash flow, balance sheets and long-term appreciation. Invest in truly competitive products and innovative technologies — especially fuel-saving designs — that may not arrive for years. Starving research and development is like eating the seed corn."
Interesting that it took him 2/3 of the column to finally get to better R&D. To my mind, that should have been up top, probably before cutting workers' benefits. Because R&D is more than simply a question of hybrid vs. fuel cell - it dictates what cars you're making. And Detroit has been making ugly, shitty cars for years. Cadillac is finally catching up to German and Japanese cars in terms of reliability. My questions - where the hell were they 20 years ago? And why hasn't the rest of GM caught up? What about Ford? The Mustang is an awesome looking car, but you don't want to own it for more than 6 years. Why is this still a problem?
"The American auto industry is vital to our national interest as an employer and as a hub for manufacturing. A managed bankruptcy may be the only path to the fundamental restructuring the industry needs. It would permit the companies to shed excess labor, pension and real estate costs. The federal government should provide guarantees for post-bankruptcy financing and assure car buyers that their warranties are not at risk. In a managed bankruptcy, the federal government would propel newly competitive and viable automakers, rather than seal their fate with a bailout check."
Right, and in bankruptcy all union contracts become null and void. Would taking care of laborers count as part of "post-bankruptcy financing" guaranteed by the federal government? Probably not if Mitt had his way.
Saturday, November 8, 2008
The Electoral Consequences of War Opposition
I'm not the most qualified to make a study of this, but I'd be interested to see if anyone wants to take on this study:
What are the medium to long term consequences for congressmen and senators who oppose moves to war? There is little doubt that they face immediate consequences - witness the Democratic losses in 2002 like Saxby Chambliss and Tom Daschle. Common wisdom (not necessarily the best guide) says that it can be political suicide to oppose a large scale march to war (so Iraq, Persian Gulf, Vietnam, as opposed to Kosovo, Somalia, Grenada). But do these consequences continue over the years? John Kerry opposed the Perisan Gulf War but voted for the Iraq War - so while he didn't win the presidency he seemingly didn't pay a price (in terms of his senate seat) for opposing a succesful, popular war and supporting a disastrous, briefly popular war. Maybe he's a bad example since he's from a reliably liberal state, but what about more vulnerable congressmen?
What are the medium to long term consequences for congressmen and senators who oppose moves to war? There is little doubt that they face immediate consequences - witness the Democratic losses in 2002 like Saxby Chambliss and Tom Daschle. Common wisdom (not necessarily the best guide) says that it can be political suicide to oppose a large scale march to war (so Iraq, Persian Gulf, Vietnam, as opposed to Kosovo, Somalia, Grenada). But do these consequences continue over the years? John Kerry opposed the Perisan Gulf War but voted for the Iraq War - so while he didn't win the presidency he seemingly didn't pay a price (in terms of his senate seat) for opposing a succesful, popular war and supporting a disastrous, briefly popular war. Maybe he's a bad example since he's from a reliably liberal state, but what about more vulnerable congressmen?
Thursday, October 30, 2008
Political Infomercials
Last night was Obama's much touted "infomercial" to make his "closing argument" in the campaign. The campaign bought time on all the networks and broadcast it simultaneously. Probably a good PR move by Obama, but one he shouldn't have had to make.
In the final days before the election, networks should be offering both candidates these platforms, rather than selling them. This is unquestionably in the public interest. Furthermore, Obama's infomercial managed to squeeze past the self-appointed middlemen, the commentators and hosts. These people are paid simply to interrupt - whether it's a "debate" show where they're all talking over each other or while a political speech is airing and they're making remarks as if they were sports casters, all they do is interrupt. The candidates both should have gotten 30 minutes infomercials free and uninterrupted. That is the networks' responsibility to voters.
In the final days before the election, networks should be offering both candidates these platforms, rather than selling them. This is unquestionably in the public interest. Furthermore, Obama's infomercial managed to squeeze past the self-appointed middlemen, the commentators and hosts. These people are paid simply to interrupt - whether it's a "debate" show where they're all talking over each other or while a political speech is airing and they're making remarks as if they were sports casters, all they do is interrupt. The candidates both should have gotten 30 minutes infomercials free and uninterrupted. That is the networks' responsibility to voters.
Colombia and the war on civilians
The Colombian government is apparently classifying lots of civilian deaths at the hands of the military as...well...go ahead and look:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/30/world/americas/30colombia.html
Why should we not be surprised?
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/30/world/americas/30colombia.html
Why should we not be surprised?
Tuesday, October 28, 2008
Walter Kirn
Met Walter Kirn today and heard him read from his memoir that he's shopping around to publishers right now. Not only is he a top-rate wit, he's really personable to boot. Perhaps my favorite of his pieces is his review of the complete New Yorker cartoons, published in 2004.
Lest we ever think that simply opposing Hamas grants one the moral high ground:
In the United States, vandalizing a religious or ethnic cemetery like this would count as a hate crime. And no, this action can't be re-described as an assertion of sovereignty by the radical settlers. It is intimidation, vandalism of the worst kind - indelibly a hate crime.
In the United States, vandalizing a religious or ethnic cemetery like this would count as a hate crime. And no, this action can't be re-described as an assertion of sovereignty by the radical settlers. It is intimidation, vandalism of the worst kind - indelibly a hate crime.
Sunday, October 26, 2008
Obama and conspiracy theories
I suppose the best hope for Obama is that the messengers get so thoroughly discredited during these last few weeks of the election that we won't have to put up with the conspiracy theories and baseless investigations that were a hallmark of the Republican response to the Clinton administration. Please, no Vince Foster was murdered stories, no Obama as drug kingpin stories, and no phony Obama real estate investment stories.
As for the last one, a little truth about Rezko - he had ties to Gov. Blagojevich, which is why he was getting his way. What, Obama as a state senator was making all that happen for Rezko? Not on your life.
As for the last one, a little truth about Rezko - he had ties to Gov. Blagojevich, which is why he was getting his way. What, Obama as a state senator was making all that happen for Rezko? Not on your life.
Saturday, October 25, 2008
USAF out of date?
Interesting post from Lawyers, Guns and Money:
http://lefarkins.blogspot.com/2008/10/global-strike.html
I suppose if the Marine Corps and Navy both have fighter and bomber units, would it maybe be worthwhile to subsume the rest of the USAF into Navy, Marine and Army?
And what to do about nukes these days? They are largely defensive weapons (unless the Neoconservative nutjobs get their way and always keep "the nuclear option" on the table whenever a third-world nation doesn't immediately accede to the United States' demands), so is it time we scaled back our delivery options to ICBMs and submarines?
http://lefarkins.blogspot.com/2008/10/global-strike.html
I suppose if the Marine Corps and Navy both have fighter and bomber units, would it maybe be worthwhile to subsume the rest of the USAF into Navy, Marine and Army?
And what to do about nukes these days? They are largely defensive weapons (unless the Neoconservative nutjobs get their way and always keep "the nuclear option" on the table whenever a third-world nation doesn't immediately accede to the United States' demands), so is it time we scaled back our delivery options to ICBMs and submarines?
Graduate school
So last year Yale accepted 14 out of 546 candidates to their political science graduate program. How does one get to be in that top 14...?
Friday, October 24, 2008
Obamacons
Many people are heralding the Obamacons, or conservatives who are endorsing Obama. Are they the 21st century's version of Reagan Democrats? Are they disgusted with Palin? There are many possible explanations, but I'd like to warn about only one.
They all recognize McCain is going down to defeat. Hard. And the Democrats have a growing possibility for gaining a 60-seat, filibuster-proof majority in the senate. I haven't watched the house races closely, but I'm sure similar things are happening there. So what do you do when you realize that the people you've supported are about to be out of power? Well, everyone loves a winner, but everyone also tries to influence a winner. Andrew Sullivan, perhaps the first Obamacon, will not sit idly by when the Democrats craft health care legislation, or immigration policy, or a withdrawal plan from Iraq, or an economic rescue plan. If he were hanging out with Republicans, his voice would (rightly) be ignored. The Democrats won't have to listen to Pat Roberts, or Thad Cochrane, so why should they listen to the commentators that hang out with those losers? While Sullivan truly does believe (it seems to me) that Obama is the best choice for president, he also believes that Obama should govern how he, Andrew Sullivan, would govern in such a situation. And so he (and lots of other Obamacon pundits, commentators, etc) will expect to be listened to because he supported the winning side. He will claim his support was "integral" to getting the moderate factions of the Republican party and independents to vote Obama. He wants to be a player. And Democrats need to remember this come January, because there will be a lot of people with non-liberal, non-progressive, non-Democratic agendas showing up at the White House, the Senate and the House of Representatives with big smiles on their faces and policy plans in their hands.
They all recognize McCain is going down to defeat. Hard. And the Democrats have a growing possibility for gaining a 60-seat, filibuster-proof majority in the senate. I haven't watched the house races closely, but I'm sure similar things are happening there. So what do you do when you realize that the people you've supported are about to be out of power? Well, everyone loves a winner, but everyone also tries to influence a winner. Andrew Sullivan, perhaps the first Obamacon, will not sit idly by when the Democrats craft health care legislation, or immigration policy, or a withdrawal plan from Iraq, or an economic rescue plan. If he were hanging out with Republicans, his voice would (rightly) be ignored. The Democrats won't have to listen to Pat Roberts, or Thad Cochrane, so why should they listen to the commentators that hang out with those losers? While Sullivan truly does believe (it seems to me) that Obama is the best choice for president, he also believes that Obama should govern how he, Andrew Sullivan, would govern in such a situation. And so he (and lots of other Obamacon pundits, commentators, etc) will expect to be listened to because he supported the winning side. He will claim his support was "integral" to getting the moderate factions of the Republican party and independents to vote Obama. He wants to be a player. And Democrats need to remember this come January, because there will be a lot of people with non-liberal, non-progressive, non-Democratic agendas showing up at the White House, the Senate and the House of Representatives with big smiles on their faces and policy plans in their hands.
The Youth Vote and Minority Voters
Ever since the 27th amendment passed, every election cycle people have said "the youth vote will make a huge impact in this election." It never has. Young people have consistently voted at much lower rates than older people. Similarly, voter turnout amongst minorities has always been lower than amongst whites, and every year people insist that minorities must turn out to support x candidate.
There is significant data showing that, despite the fact that many American politics experts waived away such a possibility as quadrennial amnesia, there will be a huge turnout amongst minorities and young people this year. Why? Well, Obama is the obvious answer. A secondary answer is that the GOP has screwed things up so bad and economy is tanking so badly that everyone is going to turn out to "vote the bums out". That may be so. But I'd like to delve a little deeper into the Obama explanation.
If turnout amongst minorities and youth is high this year, I think it will be because a candidate is finally running that they can identify with, that they recognize as both in tune to their needs as well as inspiring them to vote. Since 1972, every four years the Democrats have trotted out a candidate that young people are supposed to love. Hunter S. Thompson writes about this in Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trial '72, though he too failed to see why young people were not excited by McGovern. In the first chapter, he describes his meeting with two young men who, upon being asked for whom they will vote, shrug and say they probably won't vote at all. Thompson is floored by this, but never truly understands that there's no reason in these kids' minds to vote for McGovern.
Essentially, the Democrats have run candidates that appealed to voters who traditionally show up: middle aged and older white people. Once these candidates are selected, the partisans then show up at colleges and in minority neighborhoods to herald the arrival of a candidate that cares about them. These candidates were picked, and the partisans expect people to line up behind the chosen candidates. When viewed in this way it should be no surprise that young people and minorities are often less excited by such candidates than older white people.
Before Obama, there were three primary candidates that energized youth voters and/or minorities in a way that no general election candidates could: Eugene McCarthy in 1968, Robert F. Kennedy in 1968, and Howard Dean in 2004. RFK and McCarthy are an interesting contrast - McCarthy shook up LBJ in the New Hampshire primaries because of young, anti-war voters. LBJ's poor showing there convinced him to drop out of the race, which caused RFK to join the race to prevent McCarthy from getting the nod. Young whites, minorities, and older whites all loved RFK and flocked to him, leaving McCarthy without the base of youth voters he had used to beat LBJ with. In 2004, Howard Dean had a strong lobby of young activists, but little in the way of minority support and nothing amongst older whites. Obama in 2008 has drawn the same crowds that Dean did in '04, but added minority voters to the mix. Only recently has he picked up older white voters, but he has managed to do so.
In 2004, prominent Democrats said that young people hated Bush, and loved Kerry. They were only half right. Sure young people hated Bush, but lots of young people saw nothing in Kerry. Blacks and hispanics didn't show up for Kerry either; they were told by people that Kerry cared about their interests, but those assurances were merely that - assurances, not givens. In 1992 the media loved the young and brash Clinton-Gore ticket, and Clinton played his saxophone on Aresnio Hall's show to demonstrate how young he was. Black people supposedly loved him too - Toni Morrison and other people designated (often by whites) to speak for Blacks said they all loved him. And because Clinton won, it's easy to imagine that young people and blacks must've shown up in big numbers. But Clinton only garnered 43% of the vote that year. Ross Perot, the conservative third party candidate, took more than 15%. Getting 43% of the vote usually means you've lost by a landslide. Clearly, it wasn't a big turnout by the youth and minorities of America that swept him into power. In the early days of the 2008 primary, politicos dismissed Obama's ability to woo Black voters because, as everyone knew, Black people loved the Clintons.
Time and again we've seen old white men run for president and endured commentators who said those old white men represented the hopes and held the affections of the youth or minorities. And none of them have. Not Humphrey, not McGovern, not Carter, not Mondale, not Dukakis, not Clinton, not Gore, not Kerry. Finally we have Obama, a general election candidate who actually does represent the hopes and hold the affections of the youth and of minorities. And you know what? They chose him, and he's going to win.
There is significant data showing that, despite the fact that many American politics experts waived away such a possibility as quadrennial amnesia, there will be a huge turnout amongst minorities and young people this year. Why? Well, Obama is the obvious answer. A secondary answer is that the GOP has screwed things up so bad and economy is tanking so badly that everyone is going to turn out to "vote the bums out". That may be so. But I'd like to delve a little deeper into the Obama explanation.
If turnout amongst minorities and youth is high this year, I think it will be because a candidate is finally running that they can identify with, that they recognize as both in tune to their needs as well as inspiring them to vote. Since 1972, every four years the Democrats have trotted out a candidate that young people are supposed to love. Hunter S. Thompson writes about this in Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trial '72, though he too failed to see why young people were not excited by McGovern. In the first chapter, he describes his meeting with two young men who, upon being asked for whom they will vote, shrug and say they probably won't vote at all. Thompson is floored by this, but never truly understands that there's no reason in these kids' minds to vote for McGovern.
Essentially, the Democrats have run candidates that appealed to voters who traditionally show up: middle aged and older white people. Once these candidates are selected, the partisans then show up at colleges and in minority neighborhoods to herald the arrival of a candidate that cares about them. These candidates were picked, and the partisans expect people to line up behind the chosen candidates. When viewed in this way it should be no surprise that young people and minorities are often less excited by such candidates than older white people.
Before Obama, there were three primary candidates that energized youth voters and/or minorities in a way that no general election candidates could: Eugene McCarthy in 1968, Robert F. Kennedy in 1968, and Howard Dean in 2004. RFK and McCarthy are an interesting contrast - McCarthy shook up LBJ in the New Hampshire primaries because of young, anti-war voters. LBJ's poor showing there convinced him to drop out of the race, which caused RFK to join the race to prevent McCarthy from getting the nod. Young whites, minorities, and older whites all loved RFK and flocked to him, leaving McCarthy without the base of youth voters he had used to beat LBJ with. In 2004, Howard Dean had a strong lobby of young activists, but little in the way of minority support and nothing amongst older whites. Obama in 2008 has drawn the same crowds that Dean did in '04, but added minority voters to the mix. Only recently has he picked up older white voters, but he has managed to do so.
In 2004, prominent Democrats said that young people hated Bush, and loved Kerry. They were only half right. Sure young people hated Bush, but lots of young people saw nothing in Kerry. Blacks and hispanics didn't show up for Kerry either; they were told by people that Kerry cared about their interests, but those assurances were merely that - assurances, not givens. In 1992 the media loved the young and brash Clinton-Gore ticket, and Clinton played his saxophone on Aresnio Hall's show to demonstrate how young he was. Black people supposedly loved him too - Toni Morrison and other people designated (often by whites) to speak for Blacks said they all loved him. And because Clinton won, it's easy to imagine that young people and blacks must've shown up in big numbers. But Clinton only garnered 43% of the vote that year. Ross Perot, the conservative third party candidate, took more than 15%. Getting 43% of the vote usually means you've lost by a landslide. Clearly, it wasn't a big turnout by the youth and minorities of America that swept him into power. In the early days of the 2008 primary, politicos dismissed Obama's ability to woo Black voters because, as everyone knew, Black people loved the Clintons.
Time and again we've seen old white men run for president and endured commentators who said those old white men represented the hopes and held the affections of the youth or minorities. And none of them have. Not Humphrey, not McGovern, not Carter, not Mondale, not Dukakis, not Clinton, not Gore, not Kerry. Finally we have Obama, a general election candidate who actually does represent the hopes and hold the affections of the youth and of minorities. And you know what? They chose him, and he's going to win.
Tuesday, October 21, 2008
Thursday, October 16, 2008
Against IR Theory as Weltanschauung
Alex Fortes complained to me a few years back that none of the major schools of IR theory - realism, liberalism, constructivism - were particularly convincing, that they didn't have the explanatory power for behavior that, say, the Frankfurt School had.
Is this possibly a good thing though? Would IR theories run the risk of overdetermination or weltanschauung if their explanatory powers were made to be "stronger"?
Alternatively, is this simply an irrepressible difference between social science and philosophy?
Is this possibly a good thing though? Would IR theories run the risk of overdetermination or weltanschauung if their explanatory powers were made to be "stronger"?
Alternatively, is this simply an irrepressible difference between social science and philosophy?
The Genesis of Neoconservativism
Neoconservatives, the joke goes, are liberals who have been mugged. While that may have been true for a couple of the early neo-con writers, like Irving Kristol, their foreign policy is actually a strange offshoot from realism.
People like Wolfowitz, Kirkpatrick, etc., all shared the great realist prejudice - disdain for institutions. However, these early neo-cons (Wolfowitz was advising Reagan's people in the early 80s) didn't like the essential humility that defensive realism has as its core - that Western hegemony is impossible, and that revisionist states will ultimately overextend and crumble. But they did not take the offensive realist route, along with Mearsheimer, that Western hegemony is a rational goal, and the fact that no one has been able to acheive it doesn't disprove its possibility but rather shows that states miscalculate their strengths while pursuing this goal. Instead, they disregarded any assessment of American strength that said America couldn't just pick up and do anything. While offensive realists such as Mearsheimer made predictions that the US and its allies would mop up the USSR in a land war (a possibility that continental European countries were not eager to test), the Neo-Cons argued that the US could do all that and more by itself - allies be damned. (While at the same time publicly overestimating the USSR's bombing capabilities...scare tactics and WMD - a Neo-con tradition)
So in 2002 offensive realists asked how we could possibly invade and hold Iraq a) without major alliances, b) with minimal troop presence, and c) in the face of all the major problems that inevitably come with such a venture. Mearsheimer made his bones studying tank warfare, Pape made his studying strategic bombing and suicide terrorism. Neither had a rosy view of what a post-occupation Iraq would look like.
But Neo-Cons have never been partial to long analysis that takes into account things like asymmetrical warfare, resource allocation, regional dynamics, etc. To them, such things were mere quibbles meant to obscure the fact that the USA had the most powerful military in the world.
Neoconservatism is dead. But it shares aspects with many traditions before it. When we reflect on the invasion of Vietnam or the occupation of the Philippines, we should remeber that these conflicts were initiated, prolonged, and exacerbated by ideologues that eschewed things like regional experts and allies' opinions. There will be the possibility for many more Iraqs, Vietnams, Philippines in the future. The question is, will we recognize them before we jump headlong into disaster?
People like Wolfowitz, Kirkpatrick, etc., all shared the great realist prejudice - disdain for institutions. However, these early neo-cons (Wolfowitz was advising Reagan's people in the early 80s) didn't like the essential humility that defensive realism has as its core - that Western hegemony is impossible, and that revisionist states will ultimately overextend and crumble. But they did not take the offensive realist route, along with Mearsheimer, that Western hegemony is a rational goal, and the fact that no one has been able to acheive it doesn't disprove its possibility but rather shows that states miscalculate their strengths while pursuing this goal. Instead, they disregarded any assessment of American strength that said America couldn't just pick up and do anything. While offensive realists such as Mearsheimer made predictions that the US and its allies would mop up the USSR in a land war (a possibility that continental European countries were not eager to test), the Neo-Cons argued that the US could do all that and more by itself - allies be damned. (While at the same time publicly overestimating the USSR's bombing capabilities...scare tactics and WMD - a Neo-con tradition)
So in 2002 offensive realists asked how we could possibly invade and hold Iraq a) without major alliances, b) with minimal troop presence, and c) in the face of all the major problems that inevitably come with such a venture. Mearsheimer made his bones studying tank warfare, Pape made his studying strategic bombing and suicide terrorism. Neither had a rosy view of what a post-occupation Iraq would look like.
But Neo-Cons have never been partial to long analysis that takes into account things like asymmetrical warfare, resource allocation, regional dynamics, etc. To them, such things were mere quibbles meant to obscure the fact that the USA had the most powerful military in the world.
Neoconservatism is dead. But it shares aspects with many traditions before it. When we reflect on the invasion of Vietnam or the occupation of the Philippines, we should remeber that these conflicts were initiated, prolonged, and exacerbated by ideologues that eschewed things like regional experts and allies' opinions. There will be the possibility for many more Iraqs, Vietnams, Philippines in the future. The question is, will we recognize them before we jump headlong into disaster?
The Tombstone of Neoconservativism
Neoconservatives used morality as a central theme in their critiques of realism and liberal institutionalism. They demanded that the US confront evil abroad and defeat it. What they never considered was that the US could unwittingly unleash evil, or - worse - engage in evil itself. And when confronted with the question of becoming evil, they did not hesitate to jump aboard - torture has no greater defenders than those who believe it will somehow salvage their intellectual legacy.
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
speaking of keytars...
there is something dangerously, beautifully insane about building a keytar out of a toy piano, a ukele, attaching a kazoo and playing hits of the 80s...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XAg5KjnAhuU&feature=user
http://www.youtube.com/wat
questionable etymology
If a keytar is a guitar with a keyboard, is a sitar a guitar you play while sitting?
The Social Construction of Power in the Constitution
[This is an unfinished paper - please leave comments]
One of George W. Bush's greatest affronts to the Constitution of the United States was his consistent use of so-called "signing statements". In these documents, attached to laws passed by Congress, Bush indicated his interpretation of the law and how or whether he intended to honor it. While not the first president to issue such statements, the content of his statements were certainly the most radical. Coupled with this was an insistence on an expansive notion of executive privilege - not found in the constitution by other scholars - that claimed that advisers to the president were exempt from being called to account by the legislative or judicial branches of government. Another similarly bizzare claim was Vice-President Cheney's assertion (repeated by Press Secretary Dana Perino and other officials, justified by a few conservative pundits but universally dismissed within the legal profession) that the Office of the Vice President simultaneously occupied and did not occupy both the executive and legislative branches of government. Under this pretense, his office could exercise executive privilege but could not be restrained by rules regarding the conduct of the executive branch.
While perhaps new in degree, such executive intractability is not entirely unique. Presidents Clinton and Nixon, to name but two, also battled other branches of government in regards the extent of the executive's accountability to others. What makes the Bush administration's tenure different was the response by the other branches. While it would be an overstatement to claim that the other branches simply gave in to the administration, their failure to take more decisive action allowed most of the Bush administration's power grabs to go unchallenged. Though constitutionally the powers of each branch are defined, I argue that these powers are only meaningful insofar as they are utilized. Thus, rather than the Constitution being a power broker/bestower in the sense that a contract law theorist or institutionalist might argue, constitutionally granted power is socially constructed - it is what each branch makes (or fails to make) of it.
One might argue that the earliest example of such a construction is Chief Justice Marshall's famous definition in Marbury v. Madison of the range of judicial power. Many thousands of pages have gone into analyzing this decision, so I will only provide a rough summary - sensitive to the power considerations that were at stake in the case, Marshall defined in his decision what was the role of the judicial branch. This is the origin of "judicial review", which is now an accepted role for the judiciary. However, this is far different from what the Bush administration engaged in. Unlike Articles I and II of the Constitution that clearly delineate the roles and powers of the executive and legislative branches, the Constitution called for the creation of a Supreme Court but did not specifically assign powers to it. Thus, Marshall filled what was essentially a power vacuum.
What the Bush administration has done is challenged other branches of government to exercise their powers to the fullest extent granted by the Constitution. Anytime a branch failed to do so, the executive branch won a de facto increase in its power. It is important to stress that this occured anytime another branch did not seek or threaten to exercise its powers to the fullest extent granted by the constitution. When leading Democrats (including the House Majority
Leader Nancy Pelosi) declared, in the wake of their giant gains in the 2006 election cycle, the impeachment was off the table, this was a victory for the Bush administration. While there were many practical concerns that could have prevented impeachment (the clear lack of a 2/3 majority to convict on articles of impeachment being only the most clear), the congress had essentially announced that whatever the crimes of the Bush administration over the previous 6 years had been, there would be little in the way of consequences. Were the constitution a power broker/granter in a contractual or institutional sense, the movement towards impeachment if crimes had been committed would have been a forgone conclusion. While there would be no guarantee of conviction on articles of impeachment (nor should there ever be such a guarantee), in light of evidence of wrongdoing they should have been brought.
The congress did, in fact, subpoena members of the administration on multiple occasions.
Often, as in the cases of Harriet Miers and Joshua Bolten, they simply refused to recognize the authority of congress and didn't show up, citing "executive privilege" as a deus ex machina to whisk them away. Monica Goodling showed up (after a promise of certain types of immunity) and was only minimally forthcoming. (MG: "I know I crossed the line." Conyers: "What line? The Law?"[...] MG:"I know I crossed the line." Conyers:"Rules, laws. What line?") Then there was the interesting case of D. Kyle Sampson. He showed up, only to tell the Congress that they had no authority to open such an investigation, admit what had been defined as wrongdoing, but insist that it was not in fact wrongdoing. Paging Col. North... In each of these cases, Congress' oversight and investigation powers were mocked, with either minimal cooperation or outright dismissal or mockery. Congress does have the authority to hold people in inherent comptempt - a worthwhile option when the Attorney General insists he won't honor a subpoena. But Congress did not exert its power to the fullest extent of the law.
Does this set a precedent? Will future executive branches be able to so cavalierly flaunt the Constitution? What exactly would be the "precedent" established? It would not be an absolute precedent, by which I mean the executive branch is not as a matter of law more powerful in day-to-day operation than it had previously been - hypothetically, a re-energized congress (a Republican congress?) could push to hold future presidents to account. Given the Bush administration's (remarkably successful) refusal to recognize the powers of Congress, it's not clear that future presidents will not try the same thing. At a minimum, it certainly points to a scenario in which the executive branch's power can increase almost exponentially: if a congress is unsure of its own popularity, hedging bets against its prospects in an upcoming election cycle, the congress will fail to act decisively against a criminal (or simply overly expansive) administration. Perhaps in this recent case the Democrats in Congress (after 2006) looked at two recent battles between the executive and legislative branches - the (rare) opposition to Iraq War and its electoral consequences in 2002, as well as the Republican push to impeach Clinton and their diminished success in the 1998 election cycle - and concluded that the executive branch usually wins (in terms of popular opinion) such showdowns. So does this mean that, henceforth, any
Congress in a similar situation is de facto powerless? Or does Congress' inaction have deeper consequences?
One of George W. Bush's greatest affronts to the Constitution of the United States was his consistent use of so-called "signing statements". In these documents, attached to laws passed by Congress, Bush indicated his interpretation of the law and how or whether he intended to honor it. While not the first president to issue such statements, the content of his statements were certainly the most radical. Coupled with this was an insistence on an expansive notion of executive privilege - not found in the constitution by other scholars - that claimed that advisers to the president were exempt from being called to account by the legislative or judicial branches of government. Another similarly bizzare claim was Vice-President Cheney's assertion (repeated by Press Secretary Dana Perino and other officials, justified by a few conservative pundits but universally dismissed within the legal profession) that the Office of the Vice President simultaneously occupied and did not occupy both the executive and legislative branches of government. Under this pretense, his office could exercise executive privilege but could not be restrained by rules regarding the conduct of the executive branch.
While perhaps new in degree, such executive intractability is not entirely unique. Presidents Clinton and Nixon, to name but two, also battled other branches of government in regards the extent of the executive's accountability to others. What makes the Bush administration's tenure different was the response by the other branches. While it would be an overstatement to claim that the other branches simply gave in to the administration, their failure to take more decisive action allowed most of the Bush administration's power grabs to go unchallenged. Though constitutionally the powers of each branch are defined, I argue that these powers are only meaningful insofar as they are utilized. Thus, rather than the Constitution being a power broker/bestower in the sense that a contract law theorist or institutionalist might argue, constitutionally granted power is socially constructed - it is what each branch makes (or fails to make) of it.
One might argue that the earliest example of such a construction is Chief Justice Marshall's famous definition in Marbury v. Madison of the range of judicial power. Many thousands of pages have gone into analyzing this decision, so I will only provide a rough summary - sensitive to the power considerations that were at stake in the case, Marshall defined in his decision what was the role of the judicial branch. This is the origin of "judicial review", which is now an accepted role for the judiciary. However, this is far different from what the Bush administration engaged in. Unlike Articles I and II of the Constitution that clearly delineate the roles and powers of the executive and legislative branches, the Constitution called for the creation of a Supreme Court but did not specifically assign powers to it. Thus, Marshall filled what was essentially a power vacuum.
What the Bush administration has done is challenged other branches of government to exercise their powers to the fullest extent granted by the Constitution. Anytime a branch failed to do so, the executive branch won a de facto increase in its power. It is important to stress that this occured anytime another branch did not seek or threaten to exercise its powers to the fullest extent granted by the constitution. When leading Democrats (including the House Majority
Leader Nancy Pelosi) declared, in the wake of their giant gains in the 2006 election cycle, the impeachment was off the table, this was a victory for the Bush administration. While there were many practical concerns that could have prevented impeachment (the clear lack of a 2/3 majority to convict on articles of impeachment being only the most clear), the congress had essentially announced that whatever the crimes of the Bush administration over the previous 6 years had been, there would be little in the way of consequences. Were the constitution a power broker/granter in a contractual or institutional sense, the movement towards impeachment if crimes had been committed would have been a forgone conclusion. While there would be no guarantee of conviction on articles of impeachment (nor should there ever be such a guarantee), in light of evidence of wrongdoing they should have been brought.
The congress did, in fact, subpoena members of the administration on multiple occasions.
Often, as in the cases of Harriet Miers and Joshua Bolten, they simply refused to recognize the authority of congress and didn't show up, citing "executive privilege" as a deus ex machina to whisk them away. Monica Goodling showed up (after a promise of certain types of immunity) and was only minimally forthcoming. (MG: "I know I crossed the line." Conyers: "What line? The Law?"[...] MG:"I know I crossed the line." Conyers:"Rules, laws. What line?") Then there was the interesting case of D. Kyle Sampson. He showed up, only to tell the Congress that they had no authority to open such an investigation, admit what had been defined as wrongdoing, but insist that it was not in fact wrongdoing. Paging Col. North... In each of these cases, Congress' oversight and investigation powers were mocked, with either minimal cooperation or outright dismissal or mockery. Congress does have the authority to hold people in inherent comptempt - a worthwhile option when the Attorney General insists he won't honor a subpoena. But Congress did not exert its power to the fullest extent of the law.
Does this set a precedent? Will future executive branches be able to so cavalierly flaunt the Constitution? What exactly would be the "precedent" established? It would not be an absolute precedent, by which I mean the executive branch is not as a matter of law more powerful in day-to-day operation than it had previously been - hypothetically, a re-energized congress (a Republican congress?) could push to hold future presidents to account. Given the Bush administration's (remarkably successful) refusal to recognize the powers of Congress, it's not clear that future presidents will not try the same thing. At a minimum, it certainly points to a scenario in which the executive branch's power can increase almost exponentially: if a congress is unsure of its own popularity, hedging bets against its prospects in an upcoming election cycle, the congress will fail to act decisively against a criminal (or simply overly expansive) administration. Perhaps in this recent case the Democrats in Congress (after 2006) looked at two recent battles between the executive and legislative branches - the (rare) opposition to Iraq War and its electoral consequences in 2002, as well as the Republican push to impeach Clinton and their diminished success in the 1998 election cycle - and concluded that the executive branch usually wins (in terms of popular opinion) such showdowns. So does this mean that, henceforth, any
Congress in a similar situation is de facto powerless? Or does Congress' inaction have deeper consequences?
getting started
So I've set up a blog. As a brief summary, it will include passing thoughts as well as working ideas for papers/projects. Feel free to leave extended commentary.
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